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The biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries have long viewed patents as central to their
business models. Small biotechnology firms rely on patents, often on technology that is far
removed from an end product, for purposes of deterring misappropriation when they market
their technology [1]. Patents also help small biotechnology firms negotiate vertical R&D
alliances with pharmaceutical firms [2]. For their part, pharmaceutical firms rely on patents on
end product drugs for purposes of recouping research and development costs [3]. Recent
struggles over patent system reform – in which the biopharmaceutical industry has resisted the
attempts of information technology firms to curtail patents – underscore the industry’s
attachment to patents.
A simple opposition of biopharma to information technology would be misleading, however.
While they have resisted legislative reform, pharmaceutical firms have repeatedly engaged in
private action to promote commons of various sorts [4]. This article describes, and compares,
two types of commons creation in which pharmaceutical firms have recently engaged. In one
case, the aim has been to defeat a proliferation of upstream property rights that might
threaten an “anti–commons.” In the other, the aim is to solve the daunting research problem
of predicting drug safety and efficacy ex ante, before expensive failures in late–stage clinical
trials or after the drug has been marketed.
 
Defeating the Anti–Commons
In the late 1990s, when a proliferation of property rights over upstream research threatened to
create a “tragedy of the anti–commons” [5] by imposing significant licensing and royalty
burdens on drug development, pharmaceutical firms promoted a number of projects to defeat
these patents. One prominent effort involved single nucleotide polymorphism (SNPs), which
are single base variations found in the human genome. Individually, and in inherited
combinations known as “haplotypes,” SNPs can be used to identify genes important for
complex diseases and also to predict responses to therapeutic interventions. Pharmaceutical
firms, alarmed by the prospect of biotechnology companies securing large numbers of patents
on SNPs, joined together to put SNP information into the public domain. More recently, various
pharmaceutical firms and the microarray manufacturer Affymetrix have been involved in
patent–defeating data generation projects like the Genome Association Information Network
(GAIN). The output of the GAIN project – essentially information about which haplotypes are
associated with particular diseases – is being put into the public domain [6].
 
Solving Research Puzzles
The story of pharmaceutical firm efforts to deploy commons–based strategies in order to avert
[7] anti–commons difficulties is relatively familiar. Less familiar are recent commons–type
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efforts to address the prominent problem of declining productivity in the pharmaceutical
industry. Like the SNP Consortium, these recent efforts involve horizontal collaboration among
pharmaceutical firms. Unlike the SNP Consortium, however, the goal of these consortia is not
defeating patents.
Declining productivity has been much discussed in the popular press, in scholarly journals, and
in government white papers. But the numbers reported, which usually focus the declining
number of “new chemical entities,” actually understate the magnitude of the problem. A new
chemical entity is simply a molecule that is structurally quite different from prior molecules. It
may target the same biological/disease pathway as prior molecules (and hence not necessarily
represent a significant therapeutic advance over these prior molecules). More important than
new chemical entities are drugs that actually target new disease pathways. Here the news is
particularly disappointing. According to one recent report, over the last few years, an average
of only three drugs against novel biological targets (proteins involved in disease progression)
has reached the market in any given year [8]. This compares with an estimated 3,000
druggable targets in the human genome [9].
The productivity problem can be traced in part to ineffective testing of drug safety and efficacy
before drugs enter clinical trials. Specifically, the lack of early attention to safety and efficacy–
related characteristics of proposed molecules has resulted in growing numbers of pipeline
failures, including costly failures at late stages of clinical testing or even after FDA approval for
commercial marketing [10]. Firms have sometimes designated a “lead” compound, and
assembled a full team around it, solely on the basis of the compound having shown significant
activity (affinity and selectivity) in a high–throughput laboratory screen against an assay
containing a target protein [11].
In the case of safety and efficacy, pharmaceutical firms are beginning to heed the advice of
industry analysts that they “fundamentally review R&D business models.” [12] Specifically, in
at least two consortia, they have recognized that an optimal level of inquiry into safety may
require knowledge not contained within the boundaries of a single firm.
To the extent that pharmaceutical firms can, through collaborative efforts, find standard early
biological signs (also known as biomarkers) of a drug’s toxicity, this information could be used
by all pharmaceutical firms for a variety of cost–reducing functions, including expediting
preclinical drug safety evaluation, providing early indicators of clinical safety, and “trouble–
shooting” compounds that fail preclinical drug safety testing [13]. Indeed, to the extent that a
particular biomarker test were ultimately approved by the Food and Drug Administration as a
reliable indicator of safety, such a test might be considered an industry standard around which
all competing firms could converge [14].
In one of these consortia, the Toxicogenomic Cross–Validation Consortium (TCC), all of the
major pharmaceutical firms have committed to sharing internally developed laboratory
methods that predict the safety of new treatments. The TCC agreement sets up a commons
that relies heavily on a non–profit trusted intermediary, Critical Path, of which the FDA is a
founding member. Critical Path (and/or a Director selected by Critical Path) collects
membership fees from pharmaceutical firm participants, coordinates the selection of research
projects, and manages the flow of any confidential information. Critical Path also owns patent
rights to any intellectual property generated. It is obligated to license these patents to all
comers on commercially reasonable terms.
While the TCC focuses on tests for safety, the recently formed Biomarkers Consortium aims to
encompass research that identifies good biomarkers of both drug safety and efficacy [15]. Like
the TCC, the Biomarkers Consortium includes all of the major pharmaceutical firms. In the case
of the Biomarkers Consortium, each participant in a particular research project is entitled to a
nonexclusive license to all intellectual property created from that project.
 
The Impact on Small Firms
Commons that defeat patents look quite different from commons that aim to create standard
biomarkers. In both cases, however, the ultimate result is arguably detrimental to small
biotechnology firms. In the first case, the explicit aim is undermining the profit niche for these
small firms. In the second, undermining small firms is a collateral consequence of the fact that
developing standard biomarkers may require horizontal collaboration with a standard–setting
component, as opposed to the usual sorts of technology markets and vertical alliances.
Should we worry about undermining the role of small biotechnology firms? Economists often
champion small firms and technology markets as more likely to produce innovation than large,
vertically integrated firms. However, at least one of the reasons for economists’ endorsement
of markets is the assumption that such markets will produce relatively unencumbered
information flow. If this assumption is incorrect, or if large firms operate in a commons that
promotes information flow, the virtues of small firms are not as apparent. In the case of the
anti–commons concern, we don’t know whether significant impediments to information flow
would have emerged absent strenuous efforts by large firms to defeat patents. But it is
certainly possible. In the case of horizontal collaboration to create standard biomarkers, we
can perhaps be even more sanguine about the commons strategy. The biomarkers problem
may be sufficiently intractable that it can only be addressed through sustained collaborative
efforts made by large firms over a period of time. 
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